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Abstract 
Norway is the first, and so far the only, country to mandate a minimum fraction of female and 
male directors on corporate boards. We find that after a new gender balance law surprisingly 
stipulated that the firm must be liquidated unless at least 40% of its directors are of each 
gender, half the firms exit to an organizational form not exposed to the law. This response 
suggests that forced gender balance is costly. The costs are also firm-specific, because exit is 
more common when the firm is non-listed, successful, small, young, has powerful owners, no 
dominating family owner, and few female directors. These characteristics reflect high costs of 
involuntary board restructuring and low costs of abandoning the exposed organizational form. 
Correspondingly, certain unexposed firms hesitate to become exposed. Overall, we find that 
mandatory gender balance may produce firms with inefficient organizational forms or 
inefficient boards. 
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1. Introduction         
The choice of organizational form determines regulatory constraints on firms’ governance 
systems, such as stockholders’ ability to design the board, to separate cash flow rights from 
voting rights, and to choose the principles for financial reporting. Therefore, a regulatory shift 
may change the optimal way to organize the firm (Hansmann 1996, p. 151). This paper 
analyzes how a large and unexpected shift in corporate law, with a liquidation penalty for 
non-compliers, influences the firm’s choice of organizational form. In particular, we are the 
first to study how a new law for mandatory gender balance in the boardroom induces firms to 
exit from or not enter into the organizational form that suddenly becomes exposed to the 
stricter regulation. 
We find that half the initially exposed firms choose to exit, and that exit propensity is driven 
by firm characteristics. This result suggests that the regulation is costly for firms in general, 
more costly for some firms than for others, and also that non-exiting firms may end up with 
suboptimal boards because the benefit of keeping their exposed organizational form exceeds 
the cost of forced gender balance. Correspondingly, our findings for the entry decision 
indicate that firms choosing not to enter may keep their optimal board composition, but fail to 
obtain their best organizational form. Thus, the observed changes in exit and entry 
propensities do not reflect the full corporate cost of mandatory gender balance. 
The Norwegian Parliament passed a regulation in 2003 requiring that at least 40% of the 
firm’s directors be of each gender. Ahern and Dittmar (2012) argue that this gender balance 
law (GBL) represents a massive, surprising shock to the stockholders’ ability to design their 
firm’s board optimally. The authors also notice that the GBL represents a natural experiment 
that allows the researcher to study the choice of corporate governance mechanisms with less 
worry than usual about endogeneity problems (Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach 2010). Ahern 
and Dittmar document the magnitude of the shock by observing that the average proportion of 
female directors in listed firms was about 10% when the GBL was passed. During the next 
five years until the end of the transition period in 2008, firms complying with the 40% quota 
replaced about one third of their male directors by females. The number of female 
directorships increased by 260% (from 165 to 592 seats), while the number of male 
directorships dropped by 38% (from 1,516 to 938 seats).  
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Our paper identifies characteristics that separate firms that chose to comply with the GBL by 
making this large board restructuring, from the firms that avoided it by exiting their current 
organizational form. The firms exposed to the GBL have the ASA organizational form 
(allmennaksjeselskap), while the unexposed firms have the AS form (aksjeselskap). We also 
consider the flip side of the exit decision by analyzing how the GBL’s passage influenced the 
tendency of unexposed firms to enter the exposed form, i.e., transform from AS to ASA.  
Existing research has focused on firms that choose to remain ASA and hence comply with the 
GBL. The findings suggest that the large, forced upwards shift in the demand for female 
directors by ASA firms made it difficult to design post-GBL boards with pre-GBL qualities. 
For instance, 69% of the retained male directors had CEO experience, compared to 31% of 
the entering females. The new female directors had less board experience and were on 
average eight years younger than their male co-directors (Ahern and Dittmar 2012). Thus, 
most female directors in post-GBL ASAs differ from their male colleagues in terms of less 
experience and younger age.  
This difference means that although the GBL regulates only gender balance per se, the law 
may effectively restrict stockholders’ ability to choose a board with desired qualities. The 
reason is that such director qualities may correlate with gender. In particular, the two pools of 
potential male and female directors differ considerably along dimensions that may matter for 
the board’s ability to create firm value, such as leadership experience.1 
This impression of restricted board competence in ASAs after the GBL is supported by Ahern 
and Dittmar. They estimate an average announcement return of –3.5% for listed firms with no 
female directors when the Minister of Trade and Industry announced his plans to mandate 
gender balance. Firms with no female directors represented about three quarters of all listed 
firms at that time. This result is consistent with findings from 1989 to 2002, which is before 
the GBL was announced. The evidence suggests that the firms would most likely have lost 
value if they had voluntarily improved their boards’ gender balance (Bøhren and Strøm 2010). 
The subsequent value drop when the regulatory intent was announced suggests that 
stockholders did indeed expect a prospective GBL to be likely and costly. Also, this value 
drop does not appear to be a temporary overreaction. Firms that had to change their boards the 
                                                 
1 There is growing evidence that the gender mix influences the board’s behavior. Female directors tend to be 
associated with better board attendance (Adams and Ferreira 2009), with fewer takeover attempts and lower 
takeover premia (Levi et al. 2013), and with less layoffs and higher labor costs (Matsa and Miller 2013).  
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most typically experienced a 15% abnormal drop in their market-to-book ratio during the five 
subsequent years. 
The cost of gender balance may differ across firms. First, the compliance costs may vary 
among ASAs that choose to keep their organizational form. For instance, the reported 
announcement returns support the notion that boards with more female directors pre-GBL 
must sacrifice less board competence to reach the 40% quota post-GBL. Second, firms 
converting from ASA to AS may experience different exit costs depending on the firm’s 
listing status. This is because the GBL applies to any ASA regardless of whether it is listed or 
non-listed. However, only listed firms are required to be an ASA. Therefore, exit to avoid the 
quota automatically triggers delisting for a listed ASA, but not for a non-listed ASA. Third, 
because the GBL changes the benefit of being an ASA, the law may also influence whether 
the AS chooses to become an ASA. 
To improve the understanding of how this one-size-fits-all regulation of gender balance has 
heterogeneous effects across firms, we study how the GBL affects the choice of 
organizational form of all exposed (ASA) and unexposed (AS) firms during nine years. This 
approach provides new insight for four reasons. First, following the firms’ behavior during an 
extended time period turns out to be important. For instance, we find that among the ASAs 
that existed when the GBL was passed in 2003 and that did not subsequently merge or go 
bankrupt, 51% had chosen to exit into AS by the time the law became binding five years later. 
Second, including non-listed firms is essential not just for a priori reasons, but also because 
the exit propensity turns out to be much higher for non-listed firms than for listed firms.  
Third, we find that the tendency to enter the ASA form is not just a mere mirror image of the 
tendency to exit it. Thus, studying both exit and entry deepens the insight into regulatory 
effects. Finally, the two existing studies on valuation effects of the GBL report conflicting 
results. Ahern and Dittmar (2012) find negative valuation effects, while Nygaard (2011) finds 
positive effects using a different event date and a different sample. We avoid such ambiguity 
by analyzing how firms respond to the regulatory shift by changing organizational form. This 
direct evidence on firm behavior may improve the understanding of what forced gender 
balance does to different firms and why announcement returns vary across firms. The key is 
to identify how certain characteristics enable the firm to influence the cost of the regulatory 
shock by either keeping or changing its organizational form.  
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The GBL was announced in 2002, passed in 2003, and implemented in 2006 with a two-year 
grace period. Among the 309 ASAs in 2002 that did not subsequently merge, fail, or exit for 
reasons unrelated to the GBL, we find that 151 firms existed in 2008. The number of non-
listed ASAs decreases by 49%, while the number of listed ASAs increases by 11%. Moreover, 
unlike before the GBL, and unlike in neighboring countries without gender balance regulation, 
exit is much more common than entry.  
Thus, listed firms, which cannot remain listed unless they keep the ASA form, are exiting 
much less often than non-listed ASAs. This finding supports the argument that the GBL less 
often induces a change of organizational form when the listing benefits are high. Hence, a 
study of exits in listed firms only would miss most of the interesting cases. Moreover, because 
the change in the number of ASAs is the net of exits and entries, both exit and entry should be 
addressed. 
Regardless of listing status, we find that most exiting firms perform well and have powerful 
owners. This finding supports the idea that, independently of the GBL, profitable firms with 
low agency costs benefit the least from the strictest regulatory standards for transparency and 
governance, which happens under the ASA form. Exit is also more common among non-
family firms. This result may indicate that family owners are better able than others to 
radically change the board’s gender balance. Moreover, most firms that exit have few female 
directors, suggesting that regulatory costs are higher the more the board must be restructured. 
Also, most firms that exit are small or young. This finding may reflect that the compliance 
cost is fixed relative to firm size, and that the cost of changing organizational form grows as 
the firm matures.  
The economic significance of these results is considerably lower for firm size, firm age, 
performance, and ownership concentration than for family control, listing status, and the 
fraction of female directors. For instance, the odds of exit increase by 2.5% if the return on 
assets increases by one percentage point, while the odds decrease by 69% if the firm is listed 
rather than non-listed. 
Most of these relationships are supported by the evidence for firms converting from AS to 
ASA. The exception is that unlike for the exiting firms, the fraction of female directors in the 
entering firms is not a significant predictor of conversion. This result may be driven by the 
fact that whereas the ASA must either meet the mandatory gender quota or exit, the AS faces 
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no such pressure. The AS enters only if it expects the benefits will exceed the compliance 
costs. Radically changing the gender mix is apparently not an important driver of compliance 
costs for firms that voluntarily choose to enter. A possible reason is that they have had 
sufficient time to ensure easy access to the pool of qualified female directors. 
Our results are robust to alternative econometric techniques, to the definition of family control, 
and to how we measure performance. However, the findings do not imply that the GBL is 
more costly for firms that exit than for those that stay. The reason is that the non-exiting firms 
may find the cost of changing organizational form to be even higher than the cost of 
complying with the GBL. Thus, abandoning the more strongly regulated ASA form may be 
more burdensome than being forced to radically change board composition. This happens 
particularly often to the listed firms in our sample, where exit implies losing the listing benefit. 
Correspondingly, AS firms that choose not to enter the ASA form may still incur a GBL-
related cost. This happens because AS firms will not enter whenever the cost of complying 
with the GBL exceeds the ASA benefits that are independent of the GBL, such as easier 
access to financing and stronger legal protection of minority stockholder rights. 
This paper is related to the empirical literature on the economics of corporate governance 
regulation. Bushee and Leuz (2004) study the effect of stricter SEC disclosure requirements 
for firms trading on the OTC Bulletin Board. They find that almost 75% of the firms either go 
private or exit to the pink sheets market, which is not exposed to the new regulation. The exit 
propensity is strongest for small, profitable firms with low leverage. Engel, Hayes, and Wang 
(2004) analyze corresponding effects of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, finding a slightly 
increased tendency to go private. Small firms with high ownership concentration go private 
more often than others. A study of 17 European countries shows that firms go private more 
often when corporate governance codes are introduced and when minority protection is 
increased. Exit is more common among small and profitable firms (Thomsen and Vinten 
2007). Overall, the findings in these papers are consistent with ours. 
Ahern and Dittmar (2012) briefly address exits after the GBL in their valuation study, but 
consider only listed firms. Because ownership characteristics are not included, the authors 
ignore agency costs as a determinant of exit. This bias also applies to the valuation study of 
Nygaard (2011), who makes a robustness test of whether the firm’s listing status influences 
the relationship between exit and the fraction of female directors. Moreover, both approaches 
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are biased towards finding excessive exit because they include financial firms. Financial firms 
were allowed to convert from ASA to AS one year before the gender quota became 
mandatory. Finally, these authors do not address the entry decision. 
Norway is so far the only country with gender quotas in non-state firms. Hence, our findings 
from the first country to adopt a radically new regulation on board diversity may contribute to 
a more informed choice in countries that currently consider similar political measures. In 
particular, we can document effects from a regulatory regime that is mandatory rather than 
voluntary, dictates the same gender balance in all boards rather than allows for firm-specific 
discretion, ensures full compliance by a liquidation penalty, and applies to listed firms as well 
as to some non-listed firms rather than to all firms or just to listed firms.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the institutional setting, 
section 3 specifies our predictions, and section 4 presents the data and summary statistics. We 
explain the methodology and test the predictions in section 5, while we summarize and 
conclude in section 6. 
 
2. Institutional setting 
The first official initiatives to regulate gender balance in Norwegian corporate boards were 
made in 1999 and once more in 2001 through public hearings about possible overhaul of the 
Equal Opportunities Act from 1978. The first public announcement of the planned regulation 
was made in February 2002. The gender balance law (GBL) was passed as corporate law by 
Parliament in December 2003 and once more in June 2005, with the added provision of a 
liquidation penalty for non-compliers. The transition period from the old to the new regime 
ended at year-end 2007, although 72 firms were allowed to postpone compliance until the end 
of February 2008. 2   
The GBL states that the firm will be liquidated three months after non-compliance, although 
the government may abstain from liquidation if the firm is considered particularly important 
for society. However, no firm has been liquidated for non-compliance so far. A likely reason 
is that the alternative to fill the quota is not to liquidate, but to exit into the unexposed form. 
                                                 
2 The GBL as passed in 2003 would have been withdrawn if the firms had voluntarily filled the gender quota by June 1, 2005. 
Because that did not happen, the GBL became mandatory in 2008 (Nygaard 2011). 
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Norwegian firms with limited liability can choose between the ASA and AS organizational 
forms.3 This dual system is dominant worldwide, although exceptions exist in Canada, the 
United States, and a few other countries (Lutter 1992). The Norwegian ASA and AS forms 
resemble, respectively, A/S and ApS in Denmark, S.A. and S.A.R.L. in France, AG and 
GmbH in Germany, AB (publ.) and AB in Sweden, and Plc. and Ltd. in the United Kingdom. 
Table 1 shows how the firms in our sample can respond to the GBL by changing or not 
changing their current organizational form. 
Table 1 
The GBL applies to the ASA firms, only. Hence, an ASA may respond to the GBL by 
keeping its current organizational form. If it does, the 40% gender quota must be filled.4 This 
choice response corresponds to the first row of table 1 (Stay). Alternatively, the ASA may 
convert into an AS (Exit), which is the response shown in the second row. Unlike for Stay, the 
Exit option allows the firm to continue having a board with the preferred gender mix. 
The AS firms in rows 3 and 4 are not exposed to the GBL. If the AS chooses to become an 
ASA (Enter), it must fill the gender quota. Alternatively, the firm remains an AS (Do not 
enter) and chooses whatever gender balance the owners prefer. 
As shown by Appendix 1, the financial reporting and the corporate governance mechanisms 
are less tightly regulated for AS than for ASA. For instance, an ASA must have ten times 
larger minimum share capital, produce financial reports containing greater detail, and provide 
compensation data containing greater specificity about its officers and directors. Unlike for 
most AS firms, CEO-chair duality is illegal in ASAs, and not more than half their share 
capital can be non-voting. 
Appendix 1 also shows that there is less discretion in the design of corporate governance 
mechanisms when the ASA is listed. For instance, only listed ASAs are subject to comply-or-
explain governance codes, flagging requirements, and tender offer rules. 42% of the ASAs in 
our sample are non-listed by year-end in 2009. 
                                                 
3 The dual system was introduced in 1996 to align Norwegian corporate law with legislation in the European Union. 
4 The 40% quota applies only to boards with more than nine members. For smaller boards the quota is specified as a 
minimum number of directors per gender. There must be at least one director of each gender if the board has two or three 
members, at least two of each if there are four or five members, at least three of each if there are six to eight members, and at 
least four of each gender if the board has nine members. These thresholds imply that the quota may vary between 33% and 
50% in the cross-section of compliers. 
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Although Norway was the first country to regulate gender balance in the private sector, 
gender quota for corporate boards is currently a hot political topic internationally. The 
obvious reason is that corporate boards are strongly dominated by men. The highest fraction 
of female directors in listed firms outside Norway is 27% (Sweden), while 70% of the 43 
countries included in a recent survey have fewer than 10% of their board positions filled by 
women (www.catalyst.org). France, Iceland, Netherlands, and Spain will implement quotas in 
2013–2016. Proposals along the same lines have recently been made in Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, Italy, and the EU Commission. Gender balance rules for state-owned firms have 
already been launched in Ireland, South Africa, and Switzerland.  
Some of these countries consider whether to use mandatory law like in Norway or the softer 
comply-or-explain system, which is the common standard in national corporate governance 
codes among more than 100 countries worldwide (www.ecgi.org). Appendix 2 shows the 
details. 
 
3. Predictions 
The firm should transform itself from the ASA (exposed) to the AS (unexposed) 
organizational form when the firm benefits from doing so. This benefit, B(Exit), has three 
components:5 
(1) B (Exit) = Compliance costs – Compliance benefits – Benefits regardless of the GBL 
Exit is optimal if B(Exit) is positive. If negative, the best choice is to continue being an ASA 
in compliance with the GBL. Section 5 deals with the entry decision, where the benefit of 
entry is the negative of (1). Either way, changing organizational form requires a two-thirds 
majority vote at the stockholder meeting. 
If there are no market imperfections such as irrational owners or conflicts of interest between 
owners and managers, the compliance benefits in the second term of (1) are zero. The only 
effect of the GBL in such a case is to add a new constraint to the owners’ value maximization 
problem by ruling out in an ASA any board design involving  fewer than 40% of the positions 
                                                 
5 A similar logic is used by Engel, Hayes, and Wang (2004). 
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going to each gender. This added restriction will at best leave the owners’ opportunity set 
unchanged. 
Consequently, the GBL must be rationalized economically by its ability to reduce negative 
effects on stockholder wealth of market imperfections. In the absence of such benefits, the 
new regulation produces only compliance costs for owners as reflected in the first term of (1). 
Consistent with this view, Ahern and Dittmar (2012) argue that lack of leadership experience 
among female directors may be a major driver of compliance costs and the resulting loss of 
firm value. 
The third term in (1) explains why an ASA with low compliance benefits and high 
compliance costs may still decide not to exit. This happens when the net compliance cost of 
the GBL (the first two terms) is smaller than the benefit of being an ASA for reasons 
unrelated to the GBL (the third term). These latter reasons are independent of board 
composition and were also valid before the GBL. Examples are the benefit of having a liquid 
stock if the ASA is listed and of having the option to go public without first changing 
organizational form if the ASA is non-listed. Regardless of listing status, any ASA may also 
benefit from regulation ensuring more transparency and stronger protection of minority 
stockholders. 
The composite nature of the exit benefit in (1) has two immediate implications. First, cost 
measures based on the exiting firms alone will underestimate the full cost of the GBL. This 
happens because regulatory costs based on just exiting firms ignore the costs for firms that 
stay. The latter costs are particularly relevant for the listed firms in our sample, because they 
cannot exit without simultaneously delisting. Second, firms more likely to exit are not just 
those with high compliance costs and low compliance benefits. Exit to AS is also optimal for 
firms with low benefits from being an ASA in the first place. For such firms, the third 
component in (1) is too small to overcome even a moderate cost of the GBL. 
We next hypothesize how firm characteristics will influence the three components of B(Exit) 
in (1) and hence the likelihood of switching from the ASA to the AS organizational form after 
the GBL.  
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3.1 Compliance costs 
The costs of complying with the GBL consist of search costs for new directors, increased 
compensation costs for these directors once hired, and reduced private benefits for owners, 
who may lose control because the board is restructured.  
If the owners have chosen the optimal board composition before the GBL, forced board 
changes, and hence the compliance costs, will be higher the fewer women the board has. This 
logic is supported by Ahern and Dittmar (2012), who find that on average, only firms with no 
female directors lose market value at the GBL announcement. We predict that the lower the 
fraction of female directors, the higher the propensity to exit (H1). 
If earlier top management experience matters for director quality, the finding by Ahern and 
Dittmar (2012) that women have less such experience than men does imply that new qualified 
directors must be drawn from a smaller pool than earlier. Thus, the GBL will increase both 
search costs and compensation costs. Because these increased costs seem rather independent 
of firm size, however, compliance costs will more often produce a positive exit benefit when 
the firm is small. We expect that the smaller the firm, the higher the propensity to exit (H2).  
Family firms often have members of the controlling family in board and CEO positions 
(Anderson and Reeb 2003). To illustrate, family-controlled firms in our sample have a median 
ownership concentration of 50%, a family chairperson in 38% of these cases, and a family 
CEO in 30%. In contrast, non-family firms have a median ownership concentration of 26%, 
and the largest owner is chairperson or CEO in 17% of the cases. The GBL may therefore 
threaten the family’s ability to extract private benefits in the ASA whenever the gender mix 
among the family’s director candidates does not match the mandated gender quota. Such 
concerns for family-internal recruiting to the board suggest that ASAs controlled by families 
convert more often to the AS form than other firms after the GBL.  
Nevertheless, this concern for family-internal recruiting may not tell the full story about the 
family firm’s compliance costs. The high ownership concentration and the family’s 
governance involvement during extended periods suggest that family firms often have 
particularly powerful and committed owners. The long and deep experience with the firm and 
its environment may have enabled the family to establish a rich network with resourceful 
individuals outside the firm. Therefore, the controlling owner may know the outside pool of 
potential female directors particularly well. This argument suggests that unlike the family’s 
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ability to recruit female directors from inside the family, it may be relatively easy to fill the 
gender quota by recruiting from outside the family. Hence, compared to other firms, family-
controlled firms may exit the exposed organizational form less often rather than more often. 
We define a family-controlled firm as one where ultimate owners by blood or marriage hold 
more than half the equity. The two conflicting arguments imply that the expected relationship 
between family control and exit propensity is unspecified (H3).  
3.2 Compliance benefits 
The hypotheses discussed so far assume that owners always know their best interest, 
including the ability to establish an optimally designed board before the GBL. Allowing for 
imperfections in terms of gradual learning, however, firms may need time to locate the pool of 
director candidates and pick the best team. Such a limited ability to choose the optimal board 
may be particularly relevant for gender mix, because boards and recruiting committees were 
strongly dominated by men before the GBL (Rosener 2011). Hence, older firms with a long 
learning history pre-GBL may have been closer to their value-maximizing gender balance 
than were younger firms with a shorter history.  
This logic suggests that older firms will be hurt by a rule mandating the same gender mix for 
every firm, while younger firms may benefit from being forced to establish a more gender-
balanced board. On the other hand, older firms may find it harder to change organizational 
form because they are more complex and rigid (Boone et al. 2007). This argument suggests 
older firms are less rather than more prone to exit. Thus, the expected relationship between 
firm age and exit propensity is unspecified (H4). 
3.3 Benefits regardless of the GBL 
The ASA firms in our sample are subject to tighter reporting requirements than the AS firms 
are. This higher transparency of ASAs reduces the asymmetric information between old and 
new stockholders, between majority and minority stockholders, and also between borrowers 
and lenders. Thus, being organized under the most demanding organizational form may 
reduce the cost of raising outside finance. This option is more valuable the more financially 
constrained the firm (Myers and Majluf 1984). Using leverage to proxy for financial 
constraints, we predict that the weaker the financial constraint, the higher the propensity to 
exit (H5).  
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For similar reasons, profitable firms may suffer less after exit because they can more easily 
finance growth internally. Measuring profitability as operating returns to assets after taxes 
(ROA), we expect that the more profitable the firm, the higher the propensity to exit (H6). 
The higher transparency of ASAs than ASs because of regulatory differences may induce less 
costly and more intense monitoring by financiers, analysts, and the media. The resulting lower 
information asymmetry in ASA firms is more valuable the higher the potential agency costs, 
that is, the weaker the owners’ incentives and power to monitor management (Morck, Shleifer, 
and Vishny 1989). Hence, an ASA with low potential agency costs reaps fewer governance 
benefits from being an ASA. Moreover, these low agency costs increase the likelihood that 
the firm will rationally choose organizational form according to the value-maximizing exit 
criterion in (1). We relate agency costs to ownership concentration, which we measure as the 
fraction of outstanding equity held by the firm’s largest ultimate owner. We hypothesize that 
the higher the ownership concentration, the higher the propensity to exit (H7). 
Unlike a listed ASA, a non-listed ASA does not change listing status when exiting to AS. 
Thus, owners of listed firms have more to lose by not having their stock traded in a liquid 
market (Bahrat and Dittmar 2006). Listed firms also have a much wider stockholder base, 
which makes them more vulnerable to free-rider and coordination problems when concerted 
action would benefit all stockholders as a group (Shleifer and Vishny 1986). For instance, 
Norwegian listed and non-listed ASAs of similar size have on average roughly 4,000 and 10 
stockholders, respectively (Bøhren 2011). We expect that non-listed firms will exit more often 
than listed firms do (H8). 
Summarizing predictions H1–H8, we hypothesize that a firm with the ASA organizational 
form, which is exposed to the GBL, will exit more often to the unexposed AS form when the 
firm has low leverage, high profitability, high ownership concentration, small size, few 
female directors, and when the firm is non-listed. The expected effects on exit of firm age and 
family control are left unspecified. 
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4. Data and descriptive statistics       
To allow for approximately two non-event years at the beginning and end of the regulatory 
events described in section 2, our sample period is 2000–2009. The sample for the analysis of 
exits is based on the population of ASA firms by year-end.6 We ignore firms that exit due to 
merger or bankruptcy. Financial firms are excluded because they had to choose the ASA form 
until a new law lifted this requirement in 2007.7 Because merging firms and financial firms 
may also have left the ASA form partly because of the GBL, this sample restriction biases our 
tests towards accepting the null hypothesis that the GBL has no effect on the choice of 
organizational form. 
Table 2 shows the number of sample firms by year-end during the sample period. The total 
number of sample firms in panel A (All) represents 274 observations per year on average, 
which is 53% of the population.8 This large difference between the population and the sample 
shows that our filters are important for eliminating firms that have probably exited for other 
reasons than the GBL. 
The number of ASAs is largest in 2001, monotonically decreasing thereafter to a minimum in 
2009. Although not shown in the table, the peak in 2001 becomes more obvious if we also 
include every year from when the dual system of ASA and AS was established in 1996. The 
number of ASA firms starts at 177 in 1996 and grows every year until 2001. 
Table 2 
Panel A also documents that the decline after 2001 only happens in the sub-sample of non-
listed firms. The number of non-listed firms drops by 56% from 2001 to 2009, while the 
number of listed firms grows by 6%. This large difference suggests that if the exit decision is 
partially driven by the GBL’s introduction, the benefit of changing organizational form to 
avoid the GBL is considerably larger for non-listed firms. 
                                                 
6 Our data set is organized by the Centre for Corporate Governance Research (www.bi.edu/ccgr). The data on 
family relationships are delivered by the tax authorities (www.skatteetaten.no), while Experian 
(www.experian.no) has delivered the accounting data and the corporate governance data. 
7 Financials are also regulated differently than other firms regarding capital structure and corporate governance. 
For instance, the risk-adjusted leverage of banks cannot exceed 92% according to the Basel regulation, and 
Norwegian banking law stipulates that no investor can own more than 10% of a bank’s equity without the 
government’s permission. 
8 The population of ASA firms averages 482 firms per year. Excluding financial ASAs reduces this number to 
340, dropping further to 274 when we also exclude ASAs that go bankrupt or become AS because of a merger. 
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The change in the number of firms from one year to the next in panel A reflects the difference 
between entering firms (from AS to ASA) and exiting firms (from ASA to AS) during the 
year. Panel B shows the exits, entries, and net exits. As already documented by panel A, net 
exit (exit minus entry) is generally positive and increasing. There were altogether 217 exit 
firms and 146 entry firms, producing a net exit of 71 firms during the sample period. Panel C 
confirms that this tendency to exit is much stronger among the non-listed firms. For instance, 
while panel A shows that the number of firm years is rather independent of listing status, non-
listed firms account for over four times more of the exits (175 vs. 42, respectively). In all, 
12.1% of the non-listed firms exit yearly on average, while only 3.3% of the listed firms do. 
Panel D shows that when an AS decides to transform into ASA and hence become exposed to 
the GBL, the firm more often enters as non-listed (no IPO) than listed (IPO), where the latter 
means going public in the ASA entry year (92 firms vs. 54 firms, respectively). However, this 
tendency is reversed after the passage of the GBL, when it becomes much more common to 
go public directly. Whereas 21% of the entry firms go public directly up to 2003, 54% do so 
subsequently. This shift in IPO propensity by entry firms suggests that although compliance 
with the GBL may produce similar costs and benefits regardless of listing status, listed firms 
earn more benefits that are unrelated to the GBL. Therefore, firms considering to become 
exposed after the GBL increasingly find that entry does not pay off unless the firm quickly 
reaps the listing benefits as well. We focus on the exits in the following, leaving discussion of 
the entry decision to section 5. 
The empirical variables are defined in Appendix 3. Unreported summary statistics for these 
variables show that non-listed firms account for 55% of our observations, the largest 
stockholder owns on average 43% of the equity, the average board has 5.6 members of which 
17% are females, while 20% of the firms are majority controlled by a family.  
A firm is classified as exiting if it transforms from ASA to AS during the sample period. An 
exiting firm leaves the sample the year it actually exits. The firm is called non-exiting if it 
never abandons the ASA form during the sample period. Table 3 shows that compared to 
ASA firms that stay exposed to the GBL, the ASAs that convert to AS and hence become 
unexposed are different according to most of the hypothesized determinants. For instance, 
exiting firms have significantly fewer women on the board (10% vs. 20%), are younger (20 
years vs. 29 years), have higher ownership concentration (53% vs. 38%), and are more often 
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non-listed (78% vs. 42%). Compared to our hypotheses from section 3, these univariate 
relationships are consistent with H1, H4, H7, and H8, respectively. 
Table 3 
Unreported tests show that when we split the sample based on listing status rather than exit 
status, a similar pattern emerges as for exit vs. non-exit firms. This similarity suggests that 
whether or not the firm is listed correlates both with the exit/non-exit choice and with other 
determinants of exit beyond listing status. Thus, not controlling for listing status may create a 
serious omitted variable bias in a regression where exit is the dependent variable. That does 
not imply, however, that any other hypothesized determinant than listing status is redundant in 
an exit model. This argument is supported by the bivariate correlation coefficients, which 
show that listing status does not correlate alarmingly with any other determinant.9 
 
5. Statistical tests     
Table 2 shows that the number of firms exposed to the GBL has been dropping every year 
since 2002, when the intention to regulate gender balance in corporate boards was announced. 
Although table 2 ignores all ASA firms that become AS because of merger, bankruptcy, or 
regulatory change for financials, our filtering criteria might still have failed to exclude other 
exogenous exit determinants that are unrelated to the GBL. To account for this possibility, we 
compare the exit propensity for ASA firms in Norway with the exit propensity from the 
similar organizational form in the neighboring countries Denmark and Sweden. These two 
countries do not mandate gender-balanced boards, but they have the same system of dual 
organizational forms as Norway has. 
We use a difference-in-difference approach to test whether the tendency to change 
organizational form by Norwegian firms differs from what it is in the neighboring countries. 
The event is the passage of the GBL in 2003, and the event group is the Norwegian ASA 
firms. The alternative non-event groups are the firms in Denmark, Sweden, or both, with 
similar organizational form as the firms in the event group. The post-event period is 2003–
2009, while the pre-event period is 1996–2002. Hence, all firms in our sample have the option 
to change organizational form any time during the sample period. Only Norwegian firms may 
                                                 
9 The listed/non-listed dummy correlates the strongest with ownership concentration. The Pearson correlation 
coefficient is -0.42, which is nevertheless well below the rule-of-thumb critical limit of +/- 0.8 (Greene 2007). 
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consider exiting to avoid the GBL, however. Moreover, this can be a valid reason only in the 
post-event period. 
The statistic of interest is the difference-in-difference statistic D ≡ ΔNorway – ΔForeign, where 
ΔNorway is the difference between the number of Norwegian firms in the post-event period and 
the pre-event period, respectively. Correspondingly, ΔForeign is the difference between the 
number of firms in the two periods in the foreign country (Denmark, Sweden, or both). We 
estimate D by the model 
(2)  0 1 2 3 ,= + + + ⋅ +it i t i t ity EG PE EG PEβ β β β ε  
where yit is the number of firms in group i at time t relative to the number of group i firms in 
the event year. Because the number of firms varies strongly across the three countries, we use 
the relative rather than the absolute number of firms over time in a given country. EGi is a 
dummy variable which is 1 if the firm is in the event group and 0 if the firm is in the non-
event group. Similarly, PEt is 1 if t is in the post-event period and 0 if t is in the pre-event 
period.  
The estimator of D is the OLS estimate of β3 in (2). This coefficient reflects the effect on the 
number of firms if the observation is from Norway (rather than a neighboring country) in the 
event period (rather than in the non-event period).  
The number of firms in the three countries is shown in panel A of table 4. Two major factors 
explain why the number of firms in Denmark is much higher than in the two other countries. 
First, Norway and Sweden wrote their laws for ASA type of firms around 1995 based 
primarily on an EU directive. Denmark, however, wrote its ASA law twenty years earlier 
primarily based on its existing AS law. Second, both Danish laws are less restrictive than their 
Norwegian and Swedish counterparts (Gomard and Schaumburg-Müller 2011). For these 
reasons, we will estimate (2) using alternatively Denmark, Sweden, and both as the non-event 
group.  
Table 4 
Panel B shows the estimate of β3, which is negative and statistically significant in every case. 
The economic significance is strong. For instance, the expected number of ASA firms in the 
post-event period relative to the pre-event is 42% smaller in Norway than in Denmark. This 
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result reflects that the drop in the number of firms with organizational form exposed to the 
GBL as observed in table 2 is a unique Norwegian phenomenon. 
The findings in table 4 strengthen the impression of an inverse relationship between the 
introduction of the GBL and the use of ASA as organizational form. We analyze this link 
more closely in the following by relating the exit and entry behavior to firm characteristics as 
specified in section 2. We first report the findings from the base case, followed by a series of 
robustness tests. Finally, we present estimates of an entry model. 
 
5.1 The base case 
Our base-case model is the following: 
 
(3) 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
it it it it it
it it it it it
Exit Female directors Firm size Family control Firm age
Financial  constraints Performance Ownership concentration Listed u
α β β β β
β β β β
= + + + +
+ + + + +
 
Exitit is a dummy variable that equals 1 if firm i leaves the exposed form (ASA) during the 
sample period and 0 otherwise. We estimate (3) as a logit model, using the GLM and a sample 
from 2000–2009. 
Table 5 shows the coefficient estimates in the third column. Consistent with our prediction 
based on the compliance cost component of B(Exit) in (1), the table documents that firms 
with few female directors exit more often from the exposed to the unexposed organizational 
form (H1). This inverse relationship suggests that the costs of complying with the GBL are 
higher the more the board must be restructured in general, and the more that male directors 
must be replaced by females in particular. The finding is also in line with Ahern and Dittmar 
(2012), who report that firms with no female directors lost value when plans for a GBL were 
announced.  
Table 5 
Smaller firms exit more often than other firms do. This finding supports the economies of 
scale argument that compliance costs are fixed relative to firm size, such as the cost of 
searching for new female directors and having to pay them higher compensation because of 
short supply (H2). Moreover, firms controlled by families exit less often than other firms do. 
This result is inconsistent with the logic that the family’s ability to extract private benefits is 
threatened by a GBL that mandates a gender-based board composition the family cannot 
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match. Rather, the finding supports the argument that family owners have better access than 
others to female directors who can protect the owners’ interests (H3). 
Turning next to potential compliance benefits, the estimates show that younger firms exit 
more often than older firms do. This result is inconsistent with the ignorant-owner argument, 
but supports the notion that mature firms find it more costly to change organizational form 
(H4). 
The third component of B(Exit) in (1) is benefits of the exposed organizational form that are 
independent of the GBL. Table 5 shows that unlike what we predicted, the exit decision is not 
significantly related to financial constraints as measured by leverage (H5). A more profitable 
firm is more willing to leave the exposed form, however, possibly because it can more easily 
self-finance investments by high earnings and can also afford the higher financing costs as the 
firm becomes less transparent (H6). Exit is more common when ownership concentration is 
high. This is evidence that strong owners can be a substitute for the disciplining effect of a 
stricter regulatory regime (H7). 
Finally, non-listed firms are more prone to exit. This result supports the notion that listed 
firms have more to lose by exiting for reasons unrelated to the GBL, such as better stock 
liquidity, continuous pricing of their stock, and closer following by financial analysts and the 
media (H8). 
The odds ratios in column four of table 5 show the marginal effect of the independent 
variables on the odds of exit. An odds ratio close to one reflects an insignificant economic 
effect. The independent variable reduces the odds of exit by more the closer the odds ratio is 
to zero, while the odds increase more strongly the more the odds ratio exceeds one.  
The table documents that the economic significance of the statistically significant variables is 
relatively low for firm size, firm age, performance, and ownership concentration, medium for 
family control, and high for listing status and female directors. For instance, increasing ROA 
by one percentage point increases the odds of exit by 2.5%, while they decrease by 50% if the 
firm is controlled by a family rather than not. The odds of exit decrease by 69% if the firm is 
listed rather than non-listed, while they decrease by 95% if the board has only women rather 
than only men. 
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5.2 Robustness 
Table 6 estimates the base-case model (1) with five alternative econometric techniques. The 
table documents that the results are insensitive to whether we use logit (the base case), probit, 
a standard panel method with random effects, a logit panel method with random effects, 
pooled OLS, or pooled OLS with standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level. 
Thus, the choice of econometric technique is not driving the base-case results. 
Table 6 
Family control may be operationalized in several ways. Table 7 shows what happens when we 
measure family control by other proxies than the one used in table 5, which is whether the 
family holds a majority ownership stake (family firm). We alternatively measure family 
control by the fraction of board seats held by the family (family board), by whether the CEO 
is recruited from the family (family CEO), by the number of family members owning stock in 
the firm (family size), by whether a family member heads the board (family chair), and by the 
family’s equity in the firm (family ownership).  
The table shows that the relationship between the exit decision and all other variables than 
ownership concentration is insensitive to how we measure family control. As in the base case, 
higher ownership concentration always increases the expected exit propensity. However, the 
statistical significance is weaker when we use family control variables that do not directly 
reflect the family’s ownership rights. This result suggests that formal power at the stockholder 
meeting is the key ownership determinant of the exit decision. Overall, table 7 reflects that the 
estimates of (3) are robust to how family control is measured. 
Table 7 
Unreported tests use alternative empirical measures for financial constraints and for 
performance. Instead of measuring financial constraints by leverage, we use annual real sales 
growth during either the current, the last two, or the last three years. The estimates are 
equivalent to those in table 5. We find the same result if we measure annual ROA during the 
current year or as an average during the last three years.  
We have so far used the convention that if the firm exits at time t, it is classified as an exit 
firm also before t. Table 8 repeats the base-case result from table 5 in model I, while model II 
classifies the firm as exiting only in the year it actually switches from ASA to AS. The 
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estimates show that female directors and firm performance become insignificant determinants 
in model II, and that firm size becomes positive and significant at the 4% level. The 
relationship with exit is unaltered for ownership concentration, family control, listing status, 
and firm age.  
The insignificant relationship between exit and female directors may turn up because all firms 
in our sample tend to increase their use of female directors over time, regardless of whether 
the firm ultimately exits. For instance, firms that exit increase the average fraction of females 
on their boards before exit from 8% in 2002 to 30% in 2008. This increasing use of female 
directors regardless of exit behavior means that when a firm is classified as exiting only in the 
year it actually exits, it is an exit firm in our test only when its female director fraction is the 
highest and hence the closest to the female fraction for non-exiting firms. This is probably 
why this firm characteristic is unable to separate exiting firms from the non-exiting. 
Table 8 
Summarizing, we have shown that the base-case results are independent of what econometric 
technique we use, how we define family control, how we measure return on assets, and 
whether we use leverage or growth to measure financial constraints. The definition of an exit 
firm matters, because the fraction of female directors is not a significant predictor of exit 
behavior when the firm is classified as exiting only in the year it actually exits.10 
 
5.3 Entry 
The entry decision is expected to be driven by almost the same firm characteristics as for the 
exit decision. We specify the following model: 
(4)  1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
it it it it it
it it it it it
Entry Female directors Firm size Family control Firm age
Financial  constraints Performance Ownership concentration IPO u
α β β β β
β β β β
= + + + +
+ + + + +
 
Entry is a dummy variable that is 1 for firms that enter the exposed organizational form and 0 
otherwise. Based on the theoretical arguments for the exit decision in section 3 as specified in 
hypotheses H1–H8, we predict that entry is more likely if the firm has many female directors 
(β1 > 0), large size (β2 > 0), binding financial constraints (β5 > 0), low performance (β6 < 0), 
                                                 
10 Boards in firms with more than 200 employees have one third of their directors elected by and from the 
employees. We find no evidence that the exit decision depends on whether the board has employee directors. 
Hence, even if employee directors may be more positive to the GBL than stockholders are, stockholders do not 
seem so be influenced by this view when making the exit decision. 
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and low ownership concentration (β7 < 0). Like we did for exit, we leave unspecified the 
expected effects on entry of family control (β3) and firm age (β4). 
Because an AS firm considering entry must necessarily be non-listed, listing status is an 
irrelevant determinant. However, and as suggested by table 2, we expect the GBL will 
increase the tendency of entering firms to become listed (make an IPO; go public) directly 
upon entry rather than to stay non-listed in their new ASA form. The reason is that listed 
firms enjoy more of the benefits of being an ASA that are independent of the GBL. Hence, the 
GBL makes it relatively more attractive to be listed than non-listed once the firm is already an 
ASA. The dummy variable IPO in (4) is 1 if the entering firm chooses to become listed in the 
entry year and 0 otherwise. We expect a positive relationship between the propensity to enter 
and the tendency to become listed upon entry (β8 > 0).  
The sample is AS firms that are entry candidates during the period 2000–2009. To qualify as 
an entry candidate, the AS must have at least three board members and sales not less than the 
lowest sales observed among the ASAs.  
The estimates of the relationship in (4) are shown in table 9, which reports the results from 
two models. In model A, an AS that converts to ASA during the sample period is classified as 
entering every year until the year it enters, which is the firm’s last sample year. Model B uses 
the alternative definition, where the firm is classified as entering only in the year it actually 
enters. Unlike in the exit case, where every exit candidate already is an ASA, it seems more 
appropriate for the entry case to use the definition in model B. This definition is more 
appropriate because an entry candidate is not exposed to the GBL until it voluntarily chooses 
to enter. Moreover, many non-entering firms that qualify for entry may not even consider 
entry a relevant option. Finally, firms choosing to enter know what new regulation they must 
comply with. Hence, model B seems to reflect the more reasonable definition of an entering 
firm. 
Table 9 
The estimates are consistent with our predictions for the effect of firm size, family control, 
firm age, ownership concentration, and the decision to go public directly. The negative 
coefficient for financial constraints is inconsistent with the hypothesis, strengthening the 
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impression gathered from the exit model that financial constraints do not reliably predict 
changes in organizational form.  
The fraction of female directors is not a significant determinant of entry in model B and is 
even significantly negative in model A.11 This finding suggests that non-entering firms are not 
held back more than entering firms are by the GBL’s requirement to replace a large portion of 
the male directors. This result is apparently puzzling, given our earlier finding in table 5 that 
the existing gender mix in the board is a strong determinant of exit. However, and as already 
discussed, exiting and entering firms are fundamentally different in a GBL compliance sense. 
An ASA firm is already exposed to the GBL and has no choice in the sense that unless it exits 
to AS, it must comply with the 40% quota or accept to be liquidated. An AS, however, 
chooses to enter and hence comply only if it wants to. Therefore, AS firms that voluntarily 
decide to become ASA do so because their owners think the cost of filling the gender quota is 
small relative to the benefit of being an ASA. Apparently, the owners also consider this cost 
to be independent of the board’s current gender mix. 
Finally, tables 5 and 9 jointly document that family-controlled firms are more hesitant than 
are other firms both to exit from and to enter into the ASA form. This finding suggests that 
when new regulation changes the benefit of the status quo, family firms are inclined to keep 
their organizational form, whatever that is. One possible reason is that family-controlled firms 
have transaction costs of organizational change that are not well accounted for by the other 
independent variables in our entry and exit models. 
The odds ratios for model B in the rightmost column of table 9 show that the economic 
significance of the statistically significant determinants is low for firm size, firm age, 
performance, and ownership concentration. In contrast, the effect is strong for family control, 
financial constraints, and IPO. For instance, the odds of entry drop by 14% as the firm gets 
one year older, while they drop by 82% if the firm is controlled by a family rather than not.   
Overall, we have shown that the radical board restructuring mandated by the GBL has strong 
effects on the choice of organizational form. This evidence suggests the regulation is costly, 
and estimates made elsewhere may indicate the magnitude of this cost. First, Ahern and 
Dittmar (2012) find that listed firms with no female directors experienced an abnormal price 
                                                 
11 Unreported regressions show that the fraction of female directors continues to be insignificant when we re-
estimate the two models on the subsample of firms that enter after December 2005, when Parliament decided to 
punish non-compliers with liquidation. 
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drop of 3.5% when the intention to regulate was announced. This estimate is an upper limit 
for the average GBL cost to ASAs, because the estimate reflects the listed ASAs only, 
including the three quarters of them that must restructure their boards the most if they decide 
to stay. Second, Fjesme (2012) finds an average first-day IPO return of 2.7% at the Oslo 
Stock Exchange during 2000–2008. This evidence of IPO underpricing may represent the 
minimum average benefit for an ASA firm of being listed instead of non-listed. Hence, 3% 
may be a rough estimate of the average cost of the GBL for owners of listed firms. The 
average cost for non-listed ASAs is below 3%, because they lose less value when exiting than 
listed firms do. Importantly, however, all these estimates are averages and do not necessarily 
apply to an individual firm in the sample. This limitation follows from our finding that the 
cost and benefit of exiting or entering the organizational form exposed to the GBL depends on 
a series of firm characteristics. 
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
The findings of this paper support the idea that firms may respond to more restrictive 
regulation by changing their organizational form. Such change occurs when the added cost of 
the new regulatory constraint makes the firm’s current organizational form less attractive than 
the best alternative. Strikingly, we find that when a new law mandates at least 40% of men 
and women in Norwegian boardrooms, half the firms choose to exit into an organizational 
form that is not exposed to the law. This tendency to avoid costly regulation by changing 
organizational form varies systematically with firm characteristics. We find that exit is 
significantly more likely when the firm is profitable, small, young, and non-listed. Exiting 
firms also tend to have powerful owners, no controlling family, and few female directors. 
Most of these characteristics also influence the decision to enter the exposed organizational 
form by firms that are not exposed to the gender balance law. Even though far fewer listed 
firms exit than do non-listed firms, listed firms that do not exit may nevertheless have to bear 
the highest cost of the new regulation. 
This evidence is consistent with theoretical predictions and existing empirics on how firms 
respond to regulatory shocks. The results are also in line with earlier findings that board 
composition matters for firm value, and that compulsory gender balance in the boardroom 
shrinks the pool of competent directors and reduces stockholder wealth. Our evidence 
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supports the notion that optimal board composition and the best response to regulatory shocks 
varies from firm to firm. Moreover, gender balance regulation may be less disruptive if firms 
have the option to exit into organizational forms where the law does not apply.  
Recent political signals indicate that the exit option we analyze in this paper may soon 
disappear. In particular, gender balance in corporate boards may be made mandatory for more 
than just one organizational form.12 If that happens, Norway will not just be special for being 
the first and only country to mandate a massive, rapid shift in the composition of corporate 
boards and to punish non-compliers with liquidation. The regulators may also decide to 
eliminate the possibility firms currently have to mitigate the costs of regulatory shocks by 
transforming into organizational forms that are not exposed to the law. Every other country 
considering gender balance regulation seems to favor the comply-or-explain system or 
considerably milder sanctions than liquidation. Such regulatory regimes would leave the 
gender balance choice to the firm’s discretion and hence allow for firm heterogeneity in board 
design. Our findings suggest that compared to this more flexible alternative, the mandatory 
approach, and particularly one without exit options, is a costly way to regulate gender balance 
in corporate boards. 
  
                                                 
12 http://e24.no/jobb/naa-vil-regjeringen-ha-kvinner-i-alle-styrer/20060520. 
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Table  1: Responding to the gender balance law by choosing organizational form
Response Before the gender balance law After the gender balance law
Stay ASA ASA
Exit ASA AS
Enter AS ASA
Do not enter AS AS
Organizational form
This table shows the relationship between alternative responses to the gender balance law
(Stay, Exit, Enter, and Do not enter) and the implied choice of organizational form (ASA
and AS).
Table 2: Sample size by listing status, exit behavor, and entry behavior
Year All Non-listed Listed Exit Entry Net exit All Non-listed Listed All IPO No IPO
2000 313 187 126 8 33 -25 8 6 2 33 29 4
2001 317 190 127 14 18 -4 14 13 1 18 15 3
2002 309 187 122 17 9 8 17 13 4 9 6 3
2003 292 175 117 23 6 17 23 18 5 6 2 4
2004 283 166 117 19 10 9 19 13 6 10 5 5
2005 270 146 124 25 12 13 25 23 2 12 3 9
2006 263 130 133 28 21 7 28 24 4 21 11 10
2007 248 110 138 46 31 15 46 36 10 31 17 14
2008 231 95 136 22 5 17 22 16 6 5 3 2
2009 217 83 134 15 1 14 15 13 2 1 1 0
Average 274 147 127 22 15 7 22 18 4 15 9 5
Total 2,743 1,469 1,274 217 146 71 217 175 42 146 92 54
This table shows the number of sample firms by alternative classification criteria. Panel A shows the total number of ASA firms (All)
and the number of such firms by listing status (Non-listed and Listed), while Panel B shows the number of ASA firms that exit to AS
(Exit), the number of AS firms that enter into ASA (Entry), and the difference between the two (Net exit). Panel C splits the number of
exits from panel B into non-listed and listed firms, while panel D splits the sample of entry firms from panel B according to whether the
firm makes an initial public offering (IPO) in the entry year. ASA firms are exposed to the gender balance law, while AS firms are not.
Listed firms are quoted on the Oslo Stock Exchange. The sample is all Norwegian AS firms entering the ASA form and all Norwegian
ASA firms that are not financials or have not exited the ASA form because of takeover or bankruptcy during the sample period.
A: Listing status B: Exit and Entry C: Exit by listing status D: Entry by IPO propensity
Exit less 
Exit Non-exit Non-exit t-value (p-value)
General firm characteristics
Listed 0.221 0.582 -0.361 -20.982 (0.000)
Financial constraints 0.542 0.519 0.023 2.108 (0.035)
Growth 1.659 1.847 -0.188 -1.112 (0.268)
Performance 6.864 6.813 0.051 0.129 (0.893)
Firm age 19.800 29.428 -9.628 -8.288 (0.000)
Firm size 658.930 3,225.282 -2,566.352 -4.299 (0.000)
Ownership characteristics
Ownership concentration 52.768 37.699 15.069 11.783 (0.000)
Family ownership 35.132 30.754 4.378 4.078 (0.000)
Inside ownership 13.934 12.042 1.892 2.144 (0.032)
Board characteristics
Female directors 0.100 0.201 -0.101 -15.911 (0.000)
Board size 5.129 5.926 -0.797 -10.545 (0.000)
Family characteristics
Family firm 0.222 0.189 0.033 1.874 (0.062)
Family size 1.847 2.109 -0.262 -5.072 (0.000)
Family chair 0.200 0.221 -0.021 -1.244 (0.214)
Family CEO 0.184 0.214 -0.030 -1.923 (0.055)
Family board 0.134 0.124 0.010 1.639 (0.101)
N 1,100 1,900
Table 3: Characteristics of exit firms and non-exit firms
This table compares exit firms to non-exit firms in terms of their mean value for general firm,
ownership, board, and family characteristics. The difference between the two mean values, the t-
value, and the p-value (in parentheses) of this difference are reported in the three right-most
columns. Performance is censored at the 0.5% tail and then winzorized at the 1% and 99% tails.
Financial constraints and growth are winzorized at the 1% and 99% tails. Appendix 3 defines the
variables, and the sample is all Norwegian ASA firms in 2000–2009 that are not financials or
have not exited to the AS form because of takeover or bankruptcy during the sample period.
Unlike AS firms, ASA firms must comply with the gender balance law. 
Table 4: Exit propensity in Norway and in neighboring countries
A: Number of firms
Year Norway Denmark Sweden Denmark and Sweden
1996 177 22,572 286 22,858
1997 226 22,898 448 23,346
1998 253 23,589 420 24,009
1999 288 24,855 460 25,315
2000 313 25,978 470 26,448
2001 317 29,164 452 29,616
2002 309 30,540 430 30,970
2003 292 31,894 420 32,314
2004 283 32,519 447 32,966
2005 270 38,021 487 38,508
2006 263 39,525 533 40,058
2007 248 41,087 595 41,682
2008 231 41,778 592 42,370
2009 217 41,280 575 41,855
Average 263 31,836 473 32,308
B: Difference-in-difference regressions
Non-event group Estimate (p-value) Adjusted R2 N
Denmark -0.426 (0.000) 0.593 27
Sweden -0.271 (0.027) 0.494 27
Denmark and Sweden -0.424 (0.000) 0.592 27
This table compares the number of ASA firms in Norway with the number of firms in Denmark and Sweden
that have a similar organizational form, but that are not subject to gender balance regulation. Panel A reports
the number of firms per year, while Panel B shows estimates of the difference-in-difference equation defined
in model (2) of the main text. The estimate in the first column of results reflects the difference between the
number of Norwegian firms (the event group) in the event period and the non-event period relative to the
corresponding difference in Denmark, Sweden, or both (the three alternative non-event groups). The sample
period is 1996–2009, where 1996–2002 is the pre-event period and 2003–2009 is the post-event period. We
exclude Norwegian ASAs that are financials or firms that have exited the ASA form because of takeover or
bankruptcy during the sample period. The Danish, Swedish, and the combined Danish and Swedish samples
consist of all firms with the organizational form that is similar to the Norwegian ASA form. Sources for the
Danish and Swedish data are www.dst.dk  and Finbas, respectively.
Independent variable Prediction Coefficient estimate Odds ratio estimate
Female directors (-) -3.064 0.047
(0.000)
Firm size (-) -0.104 0.901
(0.001)
Family control (-/+) -0.701 0.496
(0.000)
Firm age (-/+) -0.011 0.989
(0.000)
Financial constraints (-) 0.349 1.418
(0.222)
Performance (+) 0.025 1.025
(0.000)
Ownership concentration (+) 0.010 1.010
(0.000)
Listed (-) -1.182 0.307
(0.000)
Constant 1.868 6.475
(0.000)
N 1,560
LR chi2(8) 377.470
Prob > chi2 (0.000)
Pseudo R2 0.182
Table 5: The base-case estimates
This table shows the estimated coefficients and the estimated odds ratios for a logit regression of
ownership, board, family, and general firm characteristics on the decision to exit or not exit the
organizational form exposed to the gender balance law. The relationship is specified in model (3) of
the main text. The predicted signs of the coefficients are shown in the second column, and the p-
values of the estimated coefficients reported in the third column are stated in parentheses underneath.
The estimated odds ratio in the rightmost column has the same p-value as the coefficient estimate.
The dependent variable is 1 if the firm is an exit firm and 0 otherwise. Female directors is the
proportion of shareholder-elected board members who are women. Firm size is the log of sales in
constant 2009 millions of NOK. Family control is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the largest
family owns more than 50% of the equity and 0 otherwise. Firm age is the number of years since the
firm was founded. Financial constraints is total debt divided by total assets. Performance is the
average real return on assets per year from year t-3 to t. Ownership concentration is the fraction of
equity held by the largest stockholder. Listed is a dummy variable which is 1 if the firm is quoted on
the Oslo Stock Exchange and 0 otherwise. Performance is censored at the 0.5% tail and then
winzorized at the 1% and 99% tails. Financial constraints is winzorized at the 1% and 99% tails. The
sample is all Norwegian ASA firms in 2000–2009 that are not financials or have not exited to the AS
form because of takeover or bankruptcy during the sample period. Unlike AS firms, ASA firms must
comply with the gender balance law. 
Independent variable Logit Probit Standard panel Logit panel Pooled OLS Clustered OLS
Female directors -3.064 -1.809 -0.897 -9.547 -0.561 -0.561
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm size -0.104 -0.061 -0.026 -0.65 -0.019 -0.019
(0.001) (0.001) (0.032) (0.003) (0.001) (0.039)
Family control -0.701 -0.421 -0.158 -4.387 -0.139 -0.139
(0.000) (0.000) (0.028) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005)
Firm age -0.011 -0.007 -0.001 -0.493 -0.002 -0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.223) (0.001) (0.000) (0.007)
Financial constraints 0.349 0.215 -0.022 1.054 0.058 0.058
(0.222) (0.209) (0.859) (0.603) (0.273) (0.499)
Performance 0.025 0.015 0.008 0.186 0.005 0.005
(0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018)
Ownership concentration 0.01 0.006 0.003 0.351 0.002 0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.062) (0.000) (0.033)
Listed -1.182 -0.706 -0.162 -3.945 -0.248 -0.248
(0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 1.868 1.105 0.581 9.093 0.856 0.856
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 1,560 1,560 1,560 1,246 1,560 1,560
LR chi2(8)/Wald chi2(8) 377.47 377.99 407.48
Prob > chi2 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
F(t,n) 53.97 24.28
Prob > F(t,n) (0.000) (0.000)
Pseudo R2 0.182 0.183 0.213 0.214 0.212
Random firm effects no no yes yes no no
Table 6: Alternative estimation methods 
This table shows the effect of estimating the base case model (3) in the main text with alternative econometric techniques. The dependent variable
is 1 if the firm is an exit firm and 0 otherwise. Logit is the base case from table 5, Probit is a probit model, Standard panel is a random effects
model with exit considered a continuous variable, Pooled OLS uses no panel method and treats exit as a continuous variable, while clustered OLS
treats exit as a continuous variable and uses standard errors adjusted for dependence between observations at the firm level. The p-values are
stated in parentheses. Female directors is the proportion of shareholder-elected board members who are women. Firm size is the log of sales in
constant 2009 millions of NOK. Family control is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the largest family owns more than 50% of the equity and 0
otherwise. Firm age is the number of years since the firm was founded. Financial constraints is total debt divided by total assets. Performance is
the average real return on assets per year from year t-3 to t. Ownership concentration is the fraction of equity held by the largest stockholder.
Listed is a dummy variable which is 1 if the firm is quoted on the Oslo Stock Exchange and 0 otherwise. Performance is censored at the 0.5% tail
and then winzorized at the 1% and 99% tails. Financial constraints is winzorized at the 1% and 99% tails. The sample is all Norwegian ASA
firms in 2000–2009 that are not financials or have not exited to the AS form because of takeover or bankruptcy during the sample period. Unlike
AS firms, ASA firms must comply with the gender balance law.
Method
Family Family Family Family Family Family
Independent variable firm board CEO size chair ownership
Female directors -3.064 -2.956 -2.876 -2.830 -2.790 -2.841
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm size -0.104 -0.129 -0.125 -0.113 -0.107 -0.125
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Family control -0.701 -1.575 -0.807 -0.195 -0.174 -0.009
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.264) (0.003) (0.002)
Firm age -0.011 -0.013 -0.012 -0.013 -0.011 -0.014
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Financial constraints 0.349 0.219 0.167 0.227 0.106 0.272
(0.222) (0.514) (0.621) (0.497) (0.751) (0.417)
Performance 0.025 0.027 0.029 0.026 0.025 0.029
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001)
Ownership concentration 0.010 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.008
(0.000) (0.112 (0.294) (0.200) (0.150) (0.015)
Listed -1.182 -1.156 -1.208 -1.097 -1.114 -1.171
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 1.868 2.120 2.051 2.231 1.955 2.235
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 1,560 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145
LR chi2(8) 377.470 269.910 279.890 259.940 267.920 268.820
Prob > chi2 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Pseudo R2 0.182 0.179 0.186 0.173 0.178 0.179
Table 7: Alternative definitions of family control
Family control definition
This table shows estimates of model (3) in the main text under six alternative proxies for family
control. The first column of results reproduces the base-case findings from table 5. The dependent
variable is 1 if the firm is an exit firm and 0 otherwise.The p-values are stated in parentheses. Female
directors is the proportion of shareholder-elected board members who are women. Firm size is the
log of sales in constant 2009 millions of NOK. Performance is the average real return on assets per
year from year t-3 to t. Ownership concentration is the fraction of equity held by the largest
stockholder. Listed is a dummy variable which is 1 if the firm is quoted on the Oslo Stock Exchange
and 0 otherwise. Performance is censored at the 0.5% tail and then winzorized at the 1% and 99%
tails. Financial constraints is winzorized at the 1% and 99% tails. The sample is all Norwegian ASA
firms in 2000–2009 that are not financials or have not exited to the AS form because of takeover or
bankruptcy during the sample period. Unlike AS firms, ASA firms must comply with the gender
balance law.
Independent variable I II
Female directors -3.064 -0.541
(0.000) (0.503)
Firm size -0.104 0.124
(0.001) (0.040)
Family control -0.701 -0.651
(0.000) (0.022)
Firm age -0.011 -0.014
(0.000) (0.010)
Financial constraints 0.349 -0.377
(0.222) (0.480)
Performance 0.025 -0.002
(0.000) (0.878)
Ownership concentration 0.010 0.017
(0.000) (0.000)
Listed -1.182 -1.881
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 1.868 -4.194
(0.000) (0.000)
N 1,560 1,060
LR chi2(8) 377.47 109.77
Prob > chi2 (0.000) (0.000)
Pseudo R2 0.182 0.162
Table 8: Defining exit status
This table shows the effect of defining exit in two alternative ways. Model I is the
base case from table 5, where the firm is classified as an exit firm every year until it
leaves the ASA oganizational form and enters the AS form at some point during the
sample period. Model II assigns exit status to the firm only in the year it becomes an
AS. The dependent variable is 1 if the firm is an exit firm and 0 otherwise.The p-
values are stated in parentheses. Female directors is the proportion of shareholder-
elected board members who are women. Firm size is the log of sales in constant 2009
millions of NOK. Family control is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the largest
family owns more than 50% of the equity and 0 otherwise. Firm age is the number of
years since the firm was founded. Financial constraints is total debt divided by total
assets. Performance is the average real return on assets per year from year t-3 to t.
Ownership concentration is the fraction of equity held by the largest stockholder.
Listed is a dummy variable which is 1 if the firm is quoted on the Oslo Stock
Exchange and 0 otherwise. Performance is censored at the 0.5% tail and then
winzorized at the 1% and 99% tails. Financial constraints is winzorized at the 1%
and 99% tails. The sample is all Norwegian ASA firms in 2000–2009 that are not
financials or have not exited to the AS form because of takeover or bankruptcy
during the sample period. Unlike AS firms, ASA firms must comply with the gender
balance law.
Model
Independent variable Prediction Coefficient estimate Odds ratio estimate Coefficient estimate Odds ratio estimate
Female directors (+) -1.381 0.251 -0.336 0.715
(0.001) (0.546)
Firm size (+) 0.226 1.254 0.178 1.195
(0.000) (0.000)
Family control (-/+) -1.455 0.233 -1.705 0.182
(0.000) (0.000)
Firm age (-/+) -0.130 0.878 -0.149 0.862
(0.000) (0.000)
Financial constraints (+) -1.640 0.194 -2.115 0.121
(0.000) (0.000)
Performance (-) -0.009 0.991 -0.003 0.997
(0.206) (0.775)
Ownership concentration (-) -0.013 0.987 -0.012 0.988
(0.000) (0.002)
IPO (+) 1.062 2.892 2.019 7.531
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant -5.277 0.005 -5.160 0.006
(0.000) (0.000)
N 126,152 126,152
LR chi2(8) 813.858 484.060
Prob > chi2 (0.000) (0.000)
Pseudo R2 0.232 0.280
This table shows the estimated coefficients and odds ratios for logit regressions of ownership, family, and general firm
characteristics on the decision of an AS firm to become an ASA and thereby become exposed to the gender balance law. The
relationship is specified in model (4) of the main text. The predicted signs of the coefficients are shown in the second column.
Model A classifies the AS firm as an entry firm every year before entry if it becomes an ASA during the sample period, while
Model B assigns entry status to the AS firm only the year it actually enters. For each model, we report the coefficient estimates, the
estimated logit ratios, and the p-value (in parenthesis) of the coefficient estimate's t-value. The odds ratio has the same p-value as
the coefficient estimate. The dependent variable is 1 if the firm is an entry firm and 0 otherwise. Female directors is the proportion
of shareholder-elected board members who are women. Firm size is the log of sales in constant 2009 millions of NOK. Family
control is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the largest family owns more than 50% of the equity and 0 otherwise. Firm age is the
number of years since the firm was founded. Financial constraints is total debt divided by total assets. Performance is the average
real return on assets per year from year t-3 to t. Ownership concentration is the fraction of equity held by the largest stockholder.
IPO is a dummy variable which is 1 if the firm becomes listed in the entry year and 0 otherwise. We censor financial constraints
and performance at the +/- 2% tails. The sample is firms with AS organizational form that are entry candidates to the ASA
organizatinal form during the period 2000–2009. To qualify as an entry candidate, the AS firm must have at least three board
members and sales not smaller than the lowest sales among the ASA firms that year. 
Table 9: The entry decision
Model A Model B
Appendix 1: Regulatory differences between limited liability firms with alternative organizational forms
Exposed listed (Public ASA) Exposed non-listed (Private ASA) Unexposed (AS)
1. Minimum share capital 1 million Norwegian kroner 1 million Norwegian kroner 0.1  million Norwegian kroner
2. Corporate governance 
code (comply-or-
explain)
The annual report must specify, item by item,
whether the firm complies with the corporate
governance code of the OSE.
No corporate governance code No corporate governance code
3.  CEO-chair duality Illegal Illegal Legal if share capital is below 3
million NOK. 
4. Gender balance on At least 40% of each gender* At least 40% of each gender* No gender balance requirement
5. Non-voting shares Up to 50% of the shares can be non-voting. Up to 50% of the shares can be non-
voting.
No restriction on non-voting
shares
6. Mandatory flagging An investor passing up and down through the
thresholds of 5%, 10%, 20%, 1/3, 50%, 2/3, and
90% of the outstanding cash flow rights or
voting rights must notify both the firm and the
OSE no later than the next morning.
No flagging rule No flagging rule
7. Mandatory tender offer An investor passing the 1/3 ownership
threshold must offer to buy all the remaining
stock in the firm.
No tender offer requirement No tender offer requirement
8. Reporting of trades by 
corporate insiders
Insiders (the firm's officers and directors) must
report their trades to the OSE no later than the
next morning.
Insiders must report to the board. The
information is not public.
No insider reporting required
9. Ownership recording The firm must report every transaction in its
outstanding equity securities to the VPS. The
notification must specify the identity of the
buyer and seller, the exact time of the
transaction, the number of securities traded, and
the security price.
The firm must report every transaction in
its outstanding equity securities to the
VPS. The notification must specify the
identity of the buyer and seller, the exact
time of the transaction, the number of
securities traded, and the security price.
The firm must have a register that
keeps track of every trade in the
firm's stock. The information is not 
public.
10. Accounting rules The firm must report in detail on the executives'
and directors' compensation, and on the
stockholdings of the officers, directors, and
their close family. The firm must report the
interest adjustment dates of their bonds.
Less detailed reporting requirements than
for listed firms on compensation,
ownership, and debt
Less detailed reporting
requirements than for listed firms
on compensation, ownership, and
debt
Regulation
This table shows regulatory differences between Norwegian limited liability firms with alternative organizational forms. An exposed firm is subject to the gender
balance law, while an unexposed firm is not. OSE is the Oslo Stock Exchange. VPS is Verdipapirsentralen (The Securities Registry).
Organizational form
* The minimum fraction of each gender varies between 33% and 50%, depending on board size. The minimum is 40% when the board has at least ten members.
Percentage of Gender Comply or explain(ce)/
Country  female directors quota Regulatory activity Mandatory(m)
Australia 8.4 no Firms should adopt and publicly explain a diversity policy. ce
Belgium* 7.7 yes A draft for a law was filed in December 2009 requiring boards of listed firms and certain non-listed
firms to choose at least one third of their directors from each gender. No sanction
pending
Canada 10.3 no The Canadian Board of Diversity was launched in November 2009 with a goal of improving
diversity on boards, including gender diversity.
pending
France* 12.7 yes Parliament proposed a law in January 2011. The law requires a quota whereby 25% of the directors
are female within 3 years and 40% within 6 years for firms employing at least 500 and with
revenues over 50 million EUR. No sanction
ce
Germany* 11.2 no The German Corporate Governance Code, which applies to listed firms, has recommendations
aimed at promoting more women on boards.
ce
Iceland 3.8 yes Law passed in March 2010; quota of 40%. No sanction pending
Italy* 3.7 yes A law was passed in December 2010 requiring one third of each gender on boards of listed firms
and state-owned firms. The law needs Senate approval and will apply to new board nominations six
months  after such approval. No sanction
pending
Netherlands* 14.0 yes A law on gender quotas for the executive and the supervisory boards received govermental approval
in December 2009. The law proposes at least 30% of each gender for the board of listed firms and
for the boards of non-listed firms that meet certain financial and employment criteria. No sanction
ce
New Zealand 7.5 no The New Zealand Shareholders' Association will make board diversity one of three priorities. pending
Norway 40.1 yes A law passed in 2003 and implemented in 2008 mandates at least 40% of each gender on the board
of listed firms and certain non-listed firms.** Non-complyers are liquidated.
m
Spain* 9.3 yes Parliament passed the Law of Equality in 2007, which requires listed firms to appoint females to
40%–60% of the board positions. Firms are allowed until 2015 to comply. No sanction ***
ce
United Kingdom* 15.0 no The Corporate Governance Code recommends gender diversity on boards. The Conservative Party
has announced that it will require that females constitute at least 50% of the candidates on the long
list of directorship candidates.
pending
United States 16.1 no The SEC approved a rule in December 2009 requiring disclosure of whether and how board
nomination committees consider diversity when identifying director candidates. If the committee or
the board has a diversity policy, the SEC rule requires disclosure of how this policy is implemented
and how the nomination committee or the board assesses the policy's effectiveness. The rule was
implemented in February 2010.
ce
Appendix 2: Regulation of gender balance in corporate boards across the world 
This table shows the regulatory status on gender quotas and the actual fraction of females in boards across the world as of 2012. In addition to the countries specified
above, Ireland, South Africa, and Switzerland have gender quotas for state-owned firms. Sources: Ahern and Dittmar (2012), www.catalyst.org  
www.corpgov.deloitte.com, and www.nho.no.
* A EU draft from November 2012 proposes a 40% target for each gender by 2020 on boards of listed firms with at least 250 employees. Each member state is supposed 
to decide whether the quota should be mandatory and what sanctions should be used for non-compliers.
** Boards with less than ten members have the quota stated as a minimum number of members per gender.
*** The government will take compliance into account when awarding state contracts to private firms.
Variable Definition
Exit Dummy variable which equals 1 if the firm leaves the organizational form 
exposed to the gender balance law (ASA) during the sample period and 0 
otherwise
Entry Dummy variable which equals 1 if the firm (AS) enters the organizational 
form exposed to the gender balance law (ASA) during the sample period and 
General firm characteristics
Listed Dummy variable which is 1 if the firm is listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange 
and 0 otherwise
Financial constraints Total debt divided by total assets (leverage)
Growth The average percentage increase in real sales per year from year t-3 to t
Performance The average real return on assets (ROA) per year from year t-3 to t
Firm age The number of years since the firm was founded
Firm size Sales in constant 2009 millions of  NOK. Log transformed in regressions
IPO Dummy variable which is 1 if the firm becomes listed the same year it enters 
the exposed organizational form (ASA) and 0 otherwise
Ownership characteristics
Ownership concentration The fraction of equity held by the largest stockholder
Family ownership The fraction of equity held by the family with the largest equity stake
Inside ownership The fraction of equity held by the officers and directors
Board characteristics
Female directors The proportion of shareholder-elected board members who are women
Board size The number of shareholder-elected board members
Family characteristics
Family firm Dummy variable which equals 1 if the largest family owns more than 50% 
of the equity and 0 otherwise
Family size The number of owners in the largest family by ownership
Family chair Dummy variable which equals 1 if the chair belongs to the largest family by 
ownership and 0 otherwise
Family CEO Dummy variable which equals 1 if the CEO belongs to the largest family by 
ownership and 0 otherwise
Family board The fraction of directors coming from the largest family by ownership
Appendix 3: The empirical variables
This table defines the variables used in the empirical analysis. The ownership characteristics are based on
ultimate (direct plus indirect) equity holdings.
